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Under current Australian regulation, life insurance companies can require applicants to 
disclose all genetic test results, including results from research or direct-to-consumer 
tests. Life insurers can then use this genetic information in underwriting and policy deci-
sions for mutually rated products, including life, permanent disability, and total income 
protection insurance. Over the past decade, many countries have implemented mora-
toria or legislative bans on the use of genetic information by life insurers. The Australian 
government, by contrast, has not reviewed regulation since 2005 when it failed to ensure 
implementation of recommendations made by the Australian Law Reform Commission. 
In that time, the Australian life insurance industry has been left to self-regulate its use of 
genetic information. As a result, insurance fears in Australia now are leading to deterred 
uptake of genetic testing by at-risk individuals and deterred participation in medical 
research, both of which have been documented. As the potential for genomic medicine 
grows, public trust and engagement are critical for successful implementation. Concerns 
around life insurance may become a barrier to the development of genomic health care, 
research, and public health initiatives in Australia, and the issue should be publicly 
addressed. We argue a moratorium on the use of genetic information by life insurers 
should be enacted while appropriate longer term policy is determined and implemented.
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Australia has a concerning lack of regulation around the use of genetic test results by the life insur-
ance industry. Many other countries have passed legislation or moratoria banning use of genetic data 
in life insurance (1). However, in Australia, life insurance applicants must still disclose results of any 
genetic test if requested. These include findings from research or direct-to-consumer genetic testing, 
if known to the applicant. Genetic results can be used for underwriting life insurance, permanent 
disability and total income protection insurance in Australia, with minimal consumer transparency 
or Government oversight into the process.
Genetic test results cannot affect private health insurance premiums in Australia, which are 
community-rated under the Private Health Insurance Act 2007 (Cth). This means private health 
insurance companies in Australia must offer the same premiums to all consumers for equivalent 
policies and cannot discriminate on the basis of health or other information.
Section 46 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) permits life insurers to discriminate 
on the basis of genetic test results, only where actuarially sound or otherwise reasonable. Yet cases 
of life insurance policies being declined or premiums loaded without adequate supporting data or 
justification have been documented in Australia over a number of years (2–4), despite the known 
difficulties in documenting such cases of discrimination (5, 6).
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In one case, a woman with an identified BRCA gene change 
indicating elevated risk of breast cancer, elected to have a bilateral 
prophylactic mastectomy to reduce her risk. However, the risk 
reduction surgery was not taken into account by her life insurer 
and in her application for death and critical illness cover, the 
insurer excluded any cancer cover and imposed a 50% premium 
loading for death cover (7).
In another case, a man with a family history of colorectal can-
cer had an identified gene change confirming his increased risk. 
He actively sought increased surveillance through colonoscopies 
to reduce his risk back down to population average, yet was still 
refused cancer cover. The man eventually obtained cover, but only 
after taking a complaint to the Human Rights Commission (8).
These examples of genetic discrimination can occur because 
of the current lack of enforced regulation of the Australian life 
insurance industry. The issue is of increasing public health con-
cern, with evidence of insurance fears now deterring the uptake of 
genetic testing and participation in medical research at a critical 
time for genomics in Australia.
The strongest evidence for deterred uptake of genetic testing 
due to insurance fears in Australia comes from within the con-
text of Lynch syndrome (increased risk of hereditary colorectal 
cancer), whereby predictive gene testing can identify risk and 
prompt surveillance to prevent cancer. A Victorian study related 
to Lynch syndrome saw the number of individuals declining pre-
dictive gene testing more than double after insurance was men-
tioned on consent forms, compared with a similar time period 
without mention of insurance (9). Predictive genetic testing for 
Lynch syndrome can identify risk and prompt surveillance to 
prevent cancer, and so the deterrence of at-risk individuals is a 
significant public health concern. A qualitative study from the 
same group found insurance fears quoted as a leading reason for 
refusal of testing in Lynch syndrome families (10). Documented 
cases of deterrence from medical research participation by 
healthy volunteers are more difficult to identify, yet do exist in 
Australia (11).
We argue that this mounting evidence, in conjunction with the 
ethical and social imperatives, justifies a moratorium on the use 
of genetic data in life insurance in Australia, with the exception 
of negative (mutation-absent) test results, until appropriate long-
term policy is implemented.
iNterNAtiONAL ActiON, AUstrALiAN 
iNActiON
Currently in Australia, genetics professionals commonly recom-
mend clients organize life insurance policies before undertaking 
genetic testing. This practice, which is designed to protect clients 
from insurers refusing cover based on the results of future genetic 
tests, can also result in some individuals declining genetic testing 
altogether due to insurance fears (9, 10). For some individuals, 
declining predictive genetic testing can mean missing out on 
information that could prompt life-saving measures, such as 
surveillance and early intervention for serious but treatable 
conditions such as cancer.
Internationally, many countries have instituted bans on the 
use of genetic test results by life insurers (1). Two noteworthy 
examples are Canada and the UK. Canada passed the Genetic Non-
Discrimination Act (previously Bill S-201) in May 2017, prohibiting 
insurers from requesting or requiring disclosure of any previous or 
future genetic test results. There is some controversy over whether 
the Act is a legitimate exercise of Federal power (12) and it has 
been referred to the Court of Appeal of Quebec for determination 
of a challenge of its Constitutionality (13). This challenge is unique 
to the division of power under Canada’s Constitution and would 
not apply in Australia.
Since 2001, a moratorium and concordat between the UK 
Government and the Association of British Insurers has been in 
place on the use of predictive genetic test results by life insur-
ers (other than negative test results and results for Huntington’s 
Disease for policies above £500,000). This moratorium has been 
extended until 2019 (14).
Furthermore, the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine and Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)8 direct 
Member States to take steps to prevent discrimination, including 
on grounds of genetic characteristics, in insurance contracts. 
A mix of legislative reforms and moratoria have been enacted as 
a result in many European countries (1).
By contrast, Australia has left its life insurance industry 
to self-regulate the use of genetic information, without inde-
pendent regulatory oversight. The Australian Government 
has not reviewed regulation since 2005 when it made non-
binding recommendations following the Australian Law Reform 
Commission report “Essentially Yours” (15, 16). Many of these 
recommendations, although commendable, unfortunately have 
not been implemented or adhered to by the Australian life insur-
ance industry.
The Financial Services Council, the peak industry body 
in Australia for life insurers, writes the Industry Standard on 
Genetic Testing (17) which binds its members. The Standard now 
contains several clauses that could be considered to conflict with 
the 2005 Government recommendations, including a recently 
added clause requiring applicants to disclose to insurers even a 
consideration of genetic testing, if requested. It is uncertain how 
insurers will use an affirmative response, but we consider even the 
inclusion of this request to be evidence of an erosion in consumer 
rights made possible by lack of regulatory oversight (18). Any 
model of industry self-regulation for the use of genetic informa-
tion by life insurers, who are inherently motivated by commercial 
gain, represents a conflict of interest. Independent government 
oversight is needed.
AUstrALiAN PArLiAMeNtArY iNQUirY 
iNtO tHe LiFe iNsUrANce iNDUstrY
In 2016, the Australian life insurance industry came under 
scrutiny by an Inquiry of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services in relation to a range of prac-
tices. Authors of this article, with input from others, presented our 
concerns regarding genetics and life insurance to the Committee 
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in May 2017 making recommendations for an immediate mora-
torium on the use of genetic test results and a flexible legislative 
instrument for long-term regulation. The written submission and 
transcripts of the public hearings can be found online (19) (see 
Supplementary Material).
Any moratorium or ban on use of genetic test results for 
life insurance in Australia should consider the use of negative 
(mutation-absent) test results to counter family history. That is, 
individuals who undertake predictive gene testing for a known 
family variant but are found not to carry the family variant, 
thereby having their risk reduced compared with gene-positive 
family members, should have this information taken into account 
by insurers to counter increased risk indicated by family history 
of disease. Without introducing such measures, any regulation 
aimed at regulating insurer conduct and protecting consumers 
from insurance discrimination is likely to have unintended 
consequences. These include excluding individuals from being 
able to prove that family history does not lead to an increased 
individual risk, which would put them in a worse position than 
currently. This would benefit some consumers to the detriment 
of others, which is a poor public health outcome. For this reason, 
an exception for negative test results has been incorporated into 
the UK Moratorium and Concordat (14).
POssiBLe iMPLicAtiONs OF A BAN
The insurance industry claims that if genetic test results cannot 
be used in life insurance, adverse selection by gene-positive 
applicants will lead to significantly increased premiums for 
consumers and incapacitate the operation of insurance markets 
(17). However, there is little evidence produced in Australia to 
support this claim. A report prepared for the Actuaries Institute 
2017 Summit (20) asserts that a ban on genetic test results will 
result in adverse selection, but its claims are arguably based 
on a set of worst-case assumptions that are unlikely to be met 
(18). Independent modeling undertaken elsewhere, including 
in Canada prior to legislation being passed, indicates that a ban 
on the use of genetic test results would not have a significant 
effect on the operation of a reasonably sized life insurance market 
(21–23).
Another argument is that genetic data should not be treated 
differently from other medical risk information. However, we 
argue that given the lack of underlying actuarial data currently 
available for genetics, the family implications of genetic test 
results, and other attendant ethical, legal and privacy issues, 
genetic data is different than and should be treated differently to 
other types of medical risk information.
We acknowledge the insurance industry must be commer-
cially viable. However, the use of individuals’ genetic informa-
tion has wide-ranging ethical and social implications which 
warrant curtailment of the industry’s use of this information. 
Over time, the self-regulating industry in Australia has changed 
its policy on genetic testing with relative freedom, meaning cur-
rent requirements for disclosure of genetic test results could be 
further changed, without necessary government involvement or 
independent regulatory oversight. This poses a growing concern 
for consumers.
Our understanding of human genetic variation is still evolving, 
and the classification of most genetic variants is not yet supported 
by robust population data, certainly not to the level of being suf-
ficient for insurance underwriting. Some of the first large-scale 
surveys of human genetic variation are only now underway (24), 
and we are still largely unaware of the true population frequency 
of most genetic risk variants. Social policy considerations, which 
include factors such as privacy, fairness, equality of access to 
insurance, non-deterrence and non-maleficence should also be 
carefully considered.
FUtUre FOr AUstrALiA
More than ever, now is a critical time for genomics and genomic 
research in Australia. The Commonwealth, Queensland, Victorian, 
and New South Wales Governments have each recently commit-
ted $25 million toward the implementation of genomics into 
health care, with new genomic technologies and whole-genome 
sequencing showing much promise. Consultation has been 
undertaken for a National Health Genomics Policy Framework, 
which aims to integrate genomics further into national health 
care. However, these steps are being taken without adequately 
addressing the issue of life insurance. As the lines between research 
and clinical care for genomics are blurred, Australia needs more 
education, consumer protection and building of public trust in 
genetics, not an environment of uncertainty, consumer fears and 
inadequate regulation. The Government must be more proactive, 
and take ownership of the issue within a specific department for 
closer oversight.
Insurance fears now represent a growing threat to public 
trust in genetics in Australia at a time when it is needed most. 
A failure to address this key issue will remain an ongoing bar-
rier if action is not taken. The threat of genetic discrimination 
in Australia has been voiced for well over a decade without a 
satisfactory Government response. The Human Genetics Society 
of Australasia has for years called for both a moratorium and 
legislation banning use of predictive genetic test results by 
the insurance industry (25). We urge Australia to follow most 
developed nations and enact a moratorium, then pass legislation 
to safeguard its population. There is still time for Australia to 
proactively address this issue; however, the time to take action 
is now.
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